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I. INTRODUCTION

Florida is one of the most aggressive states in the nation in regulating
attorney advertising.' Backed by the authority of the Florida Supreme

1. Over the years, Florida Bar leaders have frequently commented on the negative affects
of attorney advertising. For example, while serving as the Florida Bar President, Judge Patricia A.
Seitz stated, "'Aggressive ads have caused the public to see the legal system as a lottery of fictitious
claims in which lawyers make out like bandits in fees ....
This has increased the public's cynicism
about the legal system, which undermines the system that lawyers take an oath to uphold."' James
Podgers, IMAGE PROBLEM: Burned by a Fallin PublicFavor, the OrganizedBar Turns Up the
Heat on Lawyer Advertising, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 68. Former member of the Board of
Governors (Board), Mike Glazer, said, "'We need to be focusing on really bad ads and not allow
bad ads to make bad law,'.... Gary Blankenship, Bar to Take a HarderLineTowardLawyerAd
Violations, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 2000, at 13. Kelly Overstreet Johnson, while serving as Bar
President-elect, claimed, "many lawyers still dislike or oppose lawyer advertising, believing it's
the largest cause of public discontent with the profession." New Bar Panel to Review Attorney
Advertising Rules, FLA. B. NEwS, Dec. 15, 2003, at 1. According to former Board member Stuart
Grossman, "[A]dvertising is misleading because 'it's the difference between image and reputation,
and these guys who make images are making [undeserved] reputations... and they are hurting the
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Court, the Florida Bar continually pushes the First Amendment envelope
that safeguards the right of attorneys to inform potential clients about the
services they offer.2
In 2006, the Florida Supreme Court added a "licensing" scheme for
attorney advertising on television or radio to its existing panoply of
attorney advertising regulations. The new rule3 imposes a prior restraint on
all radio and television ads by Florida attorneys: every ad must run the
gauntlet of the Bar's censors prior to airing, and the ad may not air unless
its content meets with the approval of the censors. Not content with its
foray into regulating the broadcast medium, the Florida Supreme Court is
now poised to add a rule that will regulate attorney speech on the Internet
much more extensively than ever before. In the Spring of 2007, the Bar

rest of us."' Gary Blankenship, Members Sound Offon LawyerAdvertising, FLA. B. NEWS, July 15,
2004, at 10.
Kelly Overstreet Johnson created The Florida Bar's Advertising Task Force 2004 as a result
ofthe Board's lengthy and "[v]exingdiscussions" regarding whether attorney ads violated the Bar's
advertising rules. A Pair of PressingPresidentialGoals, FLA. B.J., Aug. 2004, at 19. Although
"Johnson doesn't particularly like lawyer advertising, . . .[she] acknowledges there is a First
Amendment right to advertise." Id.During her tenure as Bar President, Johnson wanted to "tighten"
Florida's advertising rules to prevent noncompliance and "'to protect the public and preserve
[lawyers' professional] image."' Id.
John DeVault, 1995-1996 Bar President, stated that advertising rules "cure []many excesses
and help improve the image of lawyers." Gary Blankenship, The Story of the FloridaBar,FLA. B.J.,
Apr. 2000, at 18, 28-29. Devault remarked, "'The ethics and professionalism push was certainly
a response to the low esteem in which the profession was coming to be viewed by everyone ....
In the last few years, it has proven its value and I think we have turned the comer as a result of
that."' Id. at 28-29. Devault further commented, "'As a learned profession, that has the threat of
totally changing what we are from a profession to totally a business .... Businesses look out for
what is best for the bottom line, not what's best for the client, the court, or the system ofjustice.'
Id.at 29.
Regarding the Board's advertising rule amendment regulating attorney web sites, Board
member Charles Chobee Ebbets said, "'Our court is more concerned with the policy issue than the
.- Gary Blankenship, Board Moves Closer to Web Site Ad Rules,
practicality of enforcement ....
FLA. B. NEWS, Jan. 1, 2007, at 1. Ebbets continued, "'[It] wants The Florida Bar to stand for the
best possible policy for protecting the dignity of lawyers. Lawyers touting themselves in various
formats to build their financial wherewithal does not strike the court as the most dignified
[activity]."' Id.Ebbetts chaired the Special Committee on Website Advertising, which wrote the
advertising rule amendment. Gary Blankenship, Board Takes New Tack on Lawyer Web Sites, FLA.
B. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at 1. "'We are trying to draft something that is fair to lawyers yet protects
the integrity of the profession,' said Board member Charles Chobee Ebbets. . . . 'It is a unique
problem that most bars have not begun to grapple with."' Id.A few months later, Ebbets claimed,
"'The way we're doing it is a level playing field for everyone .... Gary Blankenship, Board
Approves Lawyer Web Site Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 15, 2007, at 1.
2. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
3. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7 (2007).
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adopted a proposed rule that will allow it to regulate a much broader swath
of attorney speech on the Internet.4 This proposed rule, which affects both
commercial and non-commercial speech, now awaits the Florida Supreme
Court's approval, with every indication that it will be granted.5
Both the new and proposed rules, in the name of regulating speech that
is inherently misleading, in fact trench on speech that is entirely true and
accurate and on speech that makes no factual assertions whatsoever. As a
result, the new and proposed rules, if adopted, will subject Florida
attorneys to reprimand, suspension, or even disbarment for conduct
protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.6
This Article conducts an in-depth analysis of Florida's new and
proposed attorney advertising rules and demonstrates that they are not only
unconstitutional, but also fail to serve consumers' needs for legal services.
The Article first provides the background necessary to assess the
constitutionality of the rules and then addresses point-by-point their many
constitutional flaws, both procedural and substantive. Additionally, this
Article shows that Florida's new medium-specific regulations are flawed
in their conception.
The First Amendment protects attorney advertising because it provides
valuable information to potential clients and helps them make informed
and rational decisions. States may regulate attorney advertising if it is
actually or inherently misleading, or if regulation directly and materially
advances a substantial state interest and is no more extensive than
necessary to accomplish that interest. The U.S. Supreme Court has very
clearly held that a state may not base regulation of attorney advertising on
its concern for preserving attorney "dignity" or on its paternalistic desire
to withhold "potentially misleading" information from consumers.7
In its zeal to rid the airwaves and the Internet of distasteful attorney
advertising, Florida seems to have lost sight of these basic principles of
First Amendment law. Perhaps even more fundamentally, Florida seems
to have lost sight of who attorney advertising regulations are supposed to
protect, namely, Florida consumers of legal services. Consumers' interests
in learning about their legal rights and the range of legal services available

4. See id. R. 4-7.6 (2002) (amend. proposed Aug. 1,2005); see The ProposedAttorneyWeb
Site Advertising Rule, FLA. B. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at 24 (providing the text and the comment of
the proposed rule).
5. See Charles Chobee Ebbets, Special Committee on Website Advertising, FLA. B. REP.,
June 30, 2007.
6. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7. See infra notes 100 and 107 and accompanying text.
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to them are not served by paternalistic regulations that prevent them from
receiving truthful or non-misleading information. Nor are their interests
served by a regulatory scheme that seems designed to deter attorneys from
using any medium but print to reach them.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Bar's HistoricalOpposition to Attorney Advertising
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the legal
community has been divided over whether advertising by attorneys is
ethical and how advertising can, or should, be regulated. The opposition
to attorney advertising has tended to focus on its perceived impact on the
dignity of the legal profession. Disturbingly, however, much of the
opposition has come from segments of the Florida Bar that do not
routinely serve the poor and minority clients who benefit most from the
information attorney advertising provides about their legal rights and how
to vindicate them.
The history of regulating attorney advertising indicates that bar
associations have only tempered their hostility to the practice under direct
pressure from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Executive Branch.
For most of the twentieth century, states followed the lead of the American
Bar Association (ABA), which had banned all advertising except business
cards in its 1908 Canon of Ethics. 8 The most common justification for the

ABA and state bans was that advertising debased the legal profession and
commercialized the practice of law.9 The bans remained largely intact until
the 1970s, when the Department of Justice began advocating for looser
restrictions under the theory that the ban deprived consumers of the
benefits of free and open competition.'° Yielding to this pressure, the ABA
ultimately approved new rules that narrowly expanded the avenues
attorneys could use to convey information to potential clients by allowing
them to convey specified information in the yellow pages, reputable law
lists, and directories.1 l

8. See Daniel Callender, Attorney Advertising and the Use of Dramatizationin Television
Advertisements, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 89, 93 (2001).
9. Id.
10. William Hornsby, Symposium: Lawyer Advertising, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles
from the 150 Years War to Govern Client Development, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 255, 275-76 (2005).
11. Id. at275.
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The Department of Justice was not satisfied and brought an antitrust
suit against the ABA.12 The suit alleged the ABA had violated the Sherman
Act by adopting unreasonable restrictions on competitive advertising. 3
While that suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time
that attorneys had a First Amendment right to advertise, and that attorney
advertising was constitutionally protected commercial speech.' 4 The
Department of Justice dismissed its antitrust suit after the ABA revised its
rules in response. 5
Nonetheless, the ABA continued to be reluctant to permit many forms
of attorney advertising, including targeted mail solicitations. Many state
bars were also disapproving toward attorney advertising, and they began
to experiment with stringent restrictions and heavy regulations on
advertising practices. In fact, the Florida Bar is deemed to have led the
movement for more restrictive rules on attorneys' marketing efforts. 6
As the legal profession balked, the Federal Trade Commission's
Bureau of Competition, Consumer Protections and Economics became
involved in attempting to persuade the legal community to embrace
attorney advertising. It lobbied the ABA to amend its rules to allow
targeted mail solicitations. 7 It also submitted letters to several state bars
in an effort to persuade them not to adopt restrictive rules.' 8
While Florida and some other state bars moved towards a more
restrictive approach, the ABA began to loosen its restrictions during the
1990s. After several studies and research efforts, the ABA determined that
attorney advertising served an important role in informing the public.' 9
Moreover, the ABA Commission on Advertising was unable to conclude
that lawyer advertising was a primary cause of the public's negative image
of lawyers.2" Consequently, the ABA's current rules take a minimalist
approach and permit most advertising as long as the ads are not false or
misleading. However, many states, including Florida, continue to push for
increasing regulation.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
15. Hornsby, supra note 10, at 284-85.
16. Id. at 287 n.164.
17. Id. at 278-79.
18. Id. at 278.
19. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Lawyer andLawFirm WebPages as Advertising:Proposes
Guidelines, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 275, 298 (2002).
20. See Am. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ADVER., LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS:
PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 3 (1995).
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B. Leaving No Stone Unturned. FloridaRegulation of
Attorney Advertising
On November 2, 2006, the Florida Supreme Court adopted changes to
the rules regulating attorney advertising on television and radio, and
further adoption of a set of proposed rules on web site regulation is
pending. 2 The Florida Bar proposed such changes to the advertising rules
after a study by the Bar's Advertising Task Force 2004; however, the Bar's
proposal, which was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, did not match
the proposal recommended by the Task Force. In its study, according to
the Bar, the "Task Force held several meetings, solicited comments from
numerous sources, and consulted various Bar sections."22 Although the
Task Force believed review of television ads for compliance with the rules
should not be required prior to publication, the Florida Bar sought, and the
Florida Supreme Court adopted, a strict regime of mandatory review of
television ads prior to dissemination.23 Because a special committee was
still considering a proposed rule regulating Internet communications, the
Florida Supreme Court did not at that time change its existing rule
governing Internet advertising.2 4 Notably, the Task Force believed Internet
communications should not be regulated.25 However, proposed Rule 4-7.6
regulating Internet communications has now passed its first reading by the
Florida Board of Governors and was approved on March 30, 2007.26
Perhaps to bolster these new and proposed rules, the Florida Supreme
Court also requested the Bar to undertake "an additional and contemporary
study of lawyer advertising, which shall include public evaluation and
comments about lawyer advertising."27
Currently, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledge that
advertising by attorneys can provide the public with useful information,
especially "in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made
extensive use of legal services."2 However, the rules also state that
attorney advertising may be regulated when it poses dangers of
"misleading or overreaching" and "creat[ing] unwarranted expectations by

21. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Advertising, 2006 Fla. LEXIS
2594, at *2-3, 31 Fla. L. Weekly 767 (Fla. 2006).
22. Id. at *2.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. at *4.
25. Id. at *3.
26. Ebbets, supra note 5. In November 2007, the Florida Bar is scheduled to file the proposed
rule in its biannual rules petition to the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
27. Amendments, 2006 Fla. LEXIS 2594, at *6.
28. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 4-7.1(a) cmt. (2007).
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persons untrained in the law.",29 Because "[s]uch advertising can also
adversely affect the public's confidence and trust in our judicial system,"
it may be regulated by the Florida Bar under the auspices of the Florida
Supreme Court.3"
1. Regulation of Attorney Advertising in Print Media
Even before adopting its new rules governing television advertising,
Florida had taken an aggressive stance toward advertising that appeals to
the emotions or even the sense of humor of targeted consumers.3 ' To
combat such advertising tactics, Florida requires advertisements and
unsolicited written communications to include certain information, such
as the name of the lawyer and location of the practice.32 The rules then
"permit" other rather innocuous information in the advertisement about the
lawyer's practice and verifiable professional credentials. Permitted
illustrations are limited to the following: a picture of the scales ofjustice,
as long as it does not look like an official certification; a gavel; "traditional
renditions" of Lady Justice; the Statute of Liberty; the American flag; the
American eagle; the State of Florida flag; an unadorned set of law books;
the inside or outside of a courthouse; columns; diplomas; and a photograph
of the lawyer against a plain background consisting of a single color or a
plain unadorned set of law books.33 If the advertisement is limited to the
permissible information listed above, the Florida Bar will not evaluate it
for compliance with the rules.34
The Florida Bar will scrutinize all other advertisements.35 An attorney
will be subject to discipline for including any information outside the
"permissible" list36 that is false, misleading, or deceptive. 7 An
advertisement will be deemed misleading if it includes references to past
results, comparisons with other lawyers' services that cannot be factually
substantiated, or testimonials.38 The comment to the rule explains that
testimonials may lead potential clients "to infer from the testimonial that

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.R. 4-7.2(c) cmt. (2002) (amended 2006) (Prohibited information).
Id.R. 4-7.2(a) (2007).
FLA.RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(1) (2007).
Id.R. 4-7.2(b).
Id. R. 4-7.8(a)-(e) (2007).
Id.R. 4-7.2(b) (2007).
Id. R. 4-7.2(c).
FLA. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(c)(1) (2007).
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the lawyer will reach similar results in future cases."39 Thus, this rule
prohibits the publication of accurate factual information, such as the
amount of a damage award recovered by the attorney, an attorney's winloss record at trial, or a phrase such as that an attorney is "'one of the most
experienced"' in a field of law.4"
Rule 4-7.2 also prohibits certain nonfactual statements that an attorney
might wish to include in his advertisement to make it more memorable to
potential clients. The language of the rule forbids depictions, illustrations
or portrayals that are "deceptive, misleading, manipulative, or likely to
confuse the viewer."' The comments clarify that visual or verbal
descriptions "which create suspense, or contain exaggerations or appeals
to the emotions, call for legal services, or create consumer problems
42 An example of a
through characterization and dialogue" are prohibited.
43
fist.
a
of
prohibited depiction is the drawing
2. Licensing Scheme for Attorney Advertisements on
Television and Radio
The Florida Bar imposes even greater restrictions on television and
radio advertisements. The asserted purpose of the Bar's new regulatory
scheme, which appears in Rule 4-7.5, is "to ensure that [television and
radio] advertising is not misleading and does not create unreasonable or
unrealistic expectations . ..and to encourage the provision of useful
information to the public . . . ." Furthermore, the rule is intended to
prevent abuses, including "potential interferences with the fair and proper
administration of justice and the creation of incorrect public perceptions
or assumptions about the manner in which our legal system works, [as well
as] to promote the public's confidence in the legal profession and this
country's system of justice . . . ."' As a result, the rules prohibit any
features that are "deceptive, misleading, manipulative, or that [are] likely
to confuse the viewer."4' 6 This rule precludes "the use of scenes creating
suspense, scenes containing exaggerations, or situations calling for legal
services, [or depicting] consumer problems through characterization and

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. R. 4-7.2 cmt.
Id.
Id. R. 4-7.2(c)(2)-(3).
Id.R. 4-7.2 cmt.
FLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2 cmt. (2007).
Id.R. 4-7.5 cmt. (2007).
Id.
Id.R. 4-7.5(b)(1)(A).
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dialogue ... ."' Furthermore, spokespersons recognizable to the public
and any background sound other than instrumental music are also
prohibited.48 Thus, the sounds of sirens, car crashes, and jingles are
forbidden.49
3. Evaluating Compliance with the Rules
The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct require a copy of all printed
attorney advertisements, except for those that are exempt or those that fall
within the more restrictive rules for television and radio, to be filed with
the Florida Bar." Each submission costs the attorney $150,"' and the
attorney must file either prior to or concurrently with its first dissemination
of the advertisement. 2 The Bar will then notify the advertising attorney
within fifteen days whether the advertisement is in compliance with the
rules.53 Attorneys can be sanctioned for continued dissemination of
noncomplying advertisements. Attorneys must also keep a copy of each
advertisement for three years along with when and where it was used, or
to whom it was sent.55
Any written advertisement that contains either illustrations or
information other than permissible content listed in Rule 4-7.2(b) is
exempt from the filing requirements of Rule 4-7.7, which obviously
creates a strong incentive for attorneys to include only the listed content
in their advertisements. Also exempt are sponsorships of public interest
programs, entries in bar publications and law lists, and professional
announcement cards. 56 Notably, attorney web sites, previously exempt
under this same rule, would become non-exempt under the proposed rule
the Bar is now considering.
The filing requirements for print advertising are not technically a prior
restraint on attorney advertising because attorneys can avoid the filing
requirements by using only permissible content, or by disseminating their
advertisements concurrently with filing them, albeit at risk of being
disciplined later. For television and radio advertisements, however, the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. R. 4-7.5 cmt.
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.5(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2007).
Id. R. 4-7.5 cmt.
Id. R. 4-7.7(a) (2007).
Id.R. 4-7.7(b)(7).
Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(2)(A).
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7(a)(2)(C) (2007).
Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(2)(E).
Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(d).
Id. R. 4-7.8(a)-(e) (2007).

MEDIUM-SPECIFIC REGULATION OF ATTORNEYADVERTISING: A CRITIQUE

regulatory scheme chosen by the Bar is a prior restraint system in its most
traditional form. Under this scheme, an attorney wishing to advertise on
television or radio must file his proposed advertisement with the Florida
Bar at least fifteen days prior to its dissemination.57 The attorney may
request an advisory opinion prior to the television or radio ad's
dissemination, but the opinion does not satisfy the filing and evaluation
requirement and must be resubmitted in order to comply with the rule.58
The attorney can then disseminate the advertisement when he or she has
been notified by the Florida Bar that the advertisement complies with Rule
4-7.7.59
The comments to Rule 4-7.7 justify this stricter regulatory framework
based on the special "dangers" of television and radio advertising:
The unique characteristics of electronic media, including the
pervasiveness of television and radio, the numbers of viewers
reached by the electronic media, the ease with which these media
are abused, the passiveness of the viewer or listener, the short span
of usage of individual television and radio advertisements and the
inability of the bar to patrol the airwaves, make the electronic
media especially subject to regulation in the public interest.6"
Significantly, it is not clear that any of these characteristics make
television and radio advertising any more misleading than print
advertising; rather, it is clear that the Bar considers it to be more difficult
to regulate these types of advertising than print advertising.
4. Regulation of Computer-Accessed Communications
and Advertisements
Until recently, the Florida Bar considered all web sites as information
provided upon the request of a prospective client and therefore did not
apply its general rules regulating attorney advertising to them.6 ' Other
Internet communications, such as sponsored links, were advertisements
subject to the general rules.62 However, the Florida Bar, at the express
urging of several justices on the Florida Supreme Court, is proposing

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(A) (2007).
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7(a)(l)(B) (2007).
Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(E).
Id. R. 4-7.7 cmt.
Id. R. 4-7.6(b)(3) (2002), R. 4-7.1(f) (2007).
Id. R. 4-7.6(d) (2002).
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strong new rules regulating attorney advertising on the Internet.63 These
new rules were approved by the Board of Governors on March 30, 2007,
and will be submitted to the Florida Supreme Court for adoption.'
The proposed rules regulate a wide range of advertising under the
heading of "Computer-Accessed Communications," which are defined "as
information regarding a lawyer's or law firm's services that is read,
viewed, or heard directly through the use of a computer., 65 The rule
focuses predominantly on regulating attorney "homepages" and other web
sites, but its broad definition encompasses any "'[c]omputer-accessed
' 66
communication[ ]' . ..concerning a lawyer's or law firm's services[,]

which presumably includes a law-related blog by a Florida attorney, or
even a law review article written by an attorney capable of being accessed
via the Internet. The new rule would no longer treat attorney home pages
as information provided upon request, but would instead treat them, as
well as all other attorney web sites, as advertising governed in large part
by the same rules as print advertising.67
Some of the print rules, however, are loosened for attorney web sites.
The proposed rules would permit web sites to contain factually verifiable
statements concerning past results, testimonials, and factually verifiable
statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer's services
as long as these communications are not misleading.68 Statements
concerning past results must appear with the following disclaimer: "Not
all results are provided. . . , the results are not necessarily representative
of results obtained by the lawyer, and a prospective client's individual
may differ from the matter in which the results
facts and circumstance
69
...are provided.
Additionally, web sites with testimonials must include the disclaimer:
"Not all clients have provided testimonials, the results are not necessarily
representative of results obtained by the lawyer, and a prospective client's
individual facts and circumstance may differ from the matter in which the
[results] are provided."7 Quite significantly, Internet advertising would be

63. See The ProposedAttorney Website Advertising Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007,
at 24 (attributing these comments to the justices during oral arguments regarding other advertising
rule amendments).
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.6(a) (2002) (amend. proposed Aug. 1, 2005).
66. Id.
67. Id. R. 4-7.6(b)(1)-(2).
68. Id.R. 4-7.6(b)(2)(A)-(C).
69. Id.R. 4-7.6(b)(2)(A) crmt.
70. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.6(b)(2)(B) cmt. (2002) (amend. proposed Aug.
1,2005).
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exempt from the filing requirement and filing fee imposed on print
advertising. It is not immediately clear why these types of information
would be less misleading in the Internet context than in print, although the
comment to the proposed rule notes that the Bar chose an "intermediate
level"' of regulation for Internet advertising because viewers must take
some affirmative actions to access Internet advertising. The comments also
do not explain why the potential to mislead in print could not be cured
with similar disclaimers, although obviously web sites and other computeraccessed communications make it easier and less costly for advertising
attorneys to provide extra information.
The intermediate level of regulation is presumably a compromise
between the difficulty of fitting Internet advertising into existing
paradigms and the Bar's desire to regulate advertising in all media. As the
comments to the new rule note, "[W]ebsite[s] cannot be easily categorized
as either information at the request of the prospective client, which is
subject to no regulation under this subchapter ...or as advertising in a
medium that is totally unsolicited and broadly disseminated to the public,
,,72
such as television ....
5. Special Restrictions in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases
An attorney cannot send an unsolicited written communication if the
communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death
unless the accident occurred more than thirty days prior to the mailing."
This restriction is designed to protect the privacy of accident victims and
their families, to prevent abuse and overreaching, and to ensure attorney
accountability. This rule's comment suggests, "[a] prospective client often
feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal
impaired capacity for reason, judgment, and
services and may have an
74
protective self-interest.,
C. Attorney Advertising and the FirstAmendment in the U.S.
Supreme Court
Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Supreme Court cases defining the scope of the First
Amendment protection of commercial speech, and specifically attorney
advertising, reveal two related themes relevant to assessing Florida's
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.R. 4-7.6 cmt.
Id.
Id.R. 4-7.4(b)(1)(A) (2007).
Id.R. 4-7.4 cmt.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

existing and proposed Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney
advertising. The first theme is that consumers have a strong First
Amendment right to receive information about the products and services
offered in our free-market economy because such information assists
informed and rational decision-making. The second theme is that the
regulation of commercial speech must be based on consumer protection
rather than on the government's desire to withhold information from the
public to shape consumption preferences or to enforce government
standards of taste.
The U.S. Supreme Court first held that commercial speech is protected
by the First Amendment in Virginia State Boardof Pharmacyv. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., although its holding at the time was
limited to the pharmacy industry.75 The Court emphasized that the First
Amendment protects the rights of consumers to receive truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech to assist them in making informed and
reliable decisions.76 Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected taste as a basis
for regulation of commercial speech:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed."77
One year later, the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment's
mantle to attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, which
struck down Arizona's total ban on attorney advertising.78 The Supreme
Court rejected the State's argument that price advertising by attorneys was
"[i]nherently [m]isleading."79 Nor was the Court persuaded that attorney
advertising was detrimental to the standards of the legal community or
would undermine the public's image of attorneys.8" Instead, the Court

75.
(1976).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
Id. at 765, 771, 781.
Id. at 765.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
Id. at 372.
Id.at 368-69.
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found the legal profession to be similar to any other commercial business
and noted that other "[]dignified" professions advertised.8 Moreover, the
Court was concerned the lack of advertising by attorneys could leave the
public, especially those of low and moderate incomes, poorly equipped to
seek the services of an attorney.82 Even so, the Court conceded that
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations could be placed on attorney
advertising, and it limited its holding to advertising for "routine legal
services."83 The Court also limited its holding to print media, explaining
that "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media
will warrant special consideration."84
The Court later stressed, in Ohrahlikv. Ohio State BarAssociation,that
its decision in Bates does not insulate attorney communications that
interfere with a potential client's ability to make "informed and reliable
decision[s]" about legal services.85 In Ohrahlik, the Supreme Court
distinguished between attorney advertising,which is protected by the First
Amendment, and solicitation, which is not.86 Ohrahlik involved an
attorney who had been disciplined for soliciting employment from a
woman lying in traction at the hospital after a traffic accident.8 7 The Court
distinguished this situation from the general advertising at issue in Bates:
"Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and
leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection."88 Moreover, inperson solicitation "disserve[s] the individual and societal interest,
identified in Bates, in facilitating 'informed and reliable
decisionmaking."' 89 As a result, in-person solicitation by attorneys lacks
First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court's most definitive decision addressing the scope of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech came in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. PublicService Commission of New York,
which articulated the test still used by the Supreme Court to evaluate

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.at 369-70.
Id.at 370.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
Id.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978).
Id.at 455.
Id.at 467.
Id.at 457.
Id.at 458 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 364).
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regulation of commercial speech, including attorney advertising.9" The
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test has four prongs.9' First, as a
threshold matter, the regulated speech qualifies for First Amendment
protection only if it concerns lawful activity and is not false or
misleading.92 Second, a regulation will be struck down unless the State can
show its interest in restricting the speech is substantial. 93 Third, the
regulation chosen by the State must directly and materially advance the
substantial interest.94 Fourth, the regulation must not be more extensive
than necessary to serve the government's interest. 95
In In re R.MJ., the Court applied the Central Hudson test to
restrictions on attorney advertising and clarified that the mere potential for
deception is not a basis for prohibiting attorney advertising. 96 In re R.MJ.
held that the State could not limit attorney advertisements to listed
categories of information, and the Supreme Court struck down state
prohibitions on mailing of advertisements as more extensive than
necessary to prevent consumer deception. 97 The Court conceded that
attorney advertising may create more "potential for deception and
confusion" than other types of advertising. 98 As a result, "States retain the
authority to [ban] advertising that is inherently misleading or that has
proved to be misleading in practice."99 However, the Court held that states
cannot place "an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information... if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive."0 In other words, a disclosure requirement to

90. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. One other noteworthy feature of the CentralHudson
case is that the Court, in dicta, suggested that it might tolerate regulation of commercial speech that
would be struck down as prior restraints if imposed on political speech. Id. at 564 n.6, 571 n. 13.
See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979). However, in other areas, the Court held
that prior restraints, even when not imposed on core First Amendment speech, must meet stringent
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965) (striking down
a motion picture censorship system because it failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards to
ensure against unlimited suppression of constitutionally protected speech). See infra text
accompanying notes 135-40.
96. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 203.
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alert consumers to the fact that a communication is in fact advertising is
constitutionally preferable to a blanket ban on general mailings of truthful
and accurate information. Therefore, the regulation at issue in In re R.MJ.
failed the final prong of the CentralHudson test because it was "broader
than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception."' 0 '
The Supreme Court again emphasized that the mere potential for
deception or confusion could not justify a ban on attorney advertising in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. °2 In Zauderer, the Court
struck down Ohio's ban on illustrations in attorney advertisements in a
case involving an attorney advertisement containing an accurate drawing
of a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.'0 3 The Court refused to find that the
illustrations were inherently misleading or created an "unacceptable risk[]
that the public [would] be misled, manipulated, or confused."" °4 The Court
stated: "Were we to accept the State's argument in this case, we would
have little basis for preventing the government from suppressing other
forms of truthful and nondeceptive advertising .... The First Amendment
protections afforded commercial speech would mean little indeed if such
arguments were allowed to prevail."'0 5 As in In re R.MJ., the Court
seemed suspicious of regulations that would label broad categories of
attorney advertising as potentially misleading without resort to
individualized analysis.
The Zauderer decision is also noteworthy for recognizing the First
Amendment value of nontextual information in attorney advertisements.
The Zauderer Court emphasized "[t]he use of illustrations or pictures in
advertisements serves important communicative functions: it attracts the
attention of the audience to the advertiser's message[s], and it may also
serve to impart information directly."'0 6 Significantly, these
communicative functions stem in part from their emotional or noncognitive impact on the viewer, which suggests that the First Amendment
protection of commercial speech is not limited to purely factual
information.
Moreover, the Zauderer Court again rejected taste, or attorney
"dignity," as a basis for regulating attorney advertising:

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
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[T]he State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their
communications with the public is [not] an interest substantial
enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights
.... [T]he mere possibility that some members of the population
might find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify
suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some
members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.'07
The lesson to be drawn from these cases is that states may not regulate
attorney advertising on the grounds that it is potentially misleading or that
it is distasteful, but instead must provide evidence that the communications
are actually misleading and that the misleading portion cannot be cured by
disclosure requirements. These cases give significant guidance on what
kinds of state interests are insufficient to satisfy Central Hudson's
intermediate scrutiny test.
Even so, it was not until the Court's decision in FloridaBar v. Went
ForIt, Inc. that the Court indicated clearly what state interests, other than
preventing deception, are sufficient to satisfy CentralHudson.'08 Florida
Bar v. Went ForIt, Inc. is one of the few Supreme Court victories (by a 54 margin) for a state regulation of attorney advertising. The Florida Bar
regulation at issue was a narrow one. It prohibited attorneys from sending
targeted, direct mail in personal injury and wrongful death cases for a
period of thirty days after the accident or death.10 9 The majority referred
to the case as involving "targeted direct-mail solicitationsto victims and
their relatives" and applied CentralHudson's intermediate scrutiny.'
The Supreme Court first determined that the attorney mailings were
truthful and not misleading. Next, the Court found that the Florida Bar had
a substantial interest in "protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal
injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact
by lawyers."'' The substantial interest was the privacy and emotional
sanctuary during a time of grief, although the Supreme Court also noted
that the Bar's regulation was "an effort to protect the flagging reputations
107. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 648; see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)
(noting, in striking down a ban on targeted direct-mail advertising by attorneys, that the potential
"for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban."); Peel v. Attorney Regulation &
Discipline Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 96, 109-10 (1990) (finding that the mere potential for a
misleading communication is not a substantial state interest where attorney truthfully stated on
letterhead that he was certified a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy).
108. Fla. Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995).
109. Id. at 620.
110. Id. at 620, 623 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 624.
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of Florida lawyers" by preventing such privacy invasions." 2 The Court
thus validated Florida's interest in policing privacy invasions by attorneys
13
as a threat to the profession, rather than any interest in policing taste.'
Moreover, the regulation was consistent with the rationale underlying
protection of commercial speech; the thirty-day delay allowed potential
clients to make informed and rational decisions not clouded by immediate
grief.
The Went ForItdecision provided some clarity regarding how state
bars may satisfy the burden of demonstrating that their advertising
regulations address "real harm[s]."' " The Court concluded that the Florida
Bar had presented sufficient evidence that its regulation directly and
materially advanced its interest in protecting the privacy of accident
victims and their families. The evidence included a collection of empirical
studies and anecdotal information "supporting the Bar's contentions that
the Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake
of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the
profession."" 5 Finally, although the Court found the moratorium was not
the least-restrictive means available, the regulation satisfied the final prong
because the regulation was "in proportion
of the CentralHudson' inquiry
16
served."
interest
the
to
The Went ForItCourt distinguished Shapero, where a ban on targeted
direct-mail advertising was held unconstitutional, on two grounds. First,
Florida's regulation in Went ForIt was not a broad ban, but was limited
in duration." 7 Second, the state in Shapero had shown no actual harm it
was attempting to alleviate, while the Florida Bar had shown, through its
study and anecdotal research, a real harm it was attempting to address
through its study and anecdotal research."'
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed other issues specifically
related to attorney advertising. However, the Supreme Court has produced
a robust body of law concerning prior restraints. This body of law is
relevant to attorney advertising when state bars attempt to regulate
attorneys' commercial speech before they are permitted to disseminate it.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at625.
Wentfor It, 515 U.S. at 625.
dissenting).
Id.at 641 (Kennedy, J.,
Id. at626.
Id.at632.
Id.at 629-30.
Wentfor It, 515 U.S. at 629-30.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

D. FirstAmendment Restrictionson PriorRestraints on
Commercial Speech
The classic definition of a prior restraint is an administrative system
(commonly called a licensing system) that operates to grant or deny
permission to persons seeking to publish a statement prior to the
statement's dissemination. Prior restraints today can also include
injunctions against future speech." 9 By the end of the eighteenth century
in both England and America, licensing schemes had become associated
with government tyranny, and a primary motivation for the Framers of the
First Amendment was to eliminate government licensing of the press.
Professor Thomas Emerson succinctly described the special dangers of
licensing schemes as follows:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a
system of subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under
government scrutiny a far wider range of expression; it shuts off
communication before it takes place;.., suppression by a stroke of
the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a
criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public
appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward
excesses, as the history of all censorship shows. 2 °
The Supreme Court has called prior restraints, whether in the form of
licensing schemes or injunctions on expression, the "least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights," and has held that they are
presumptively unconstitutional.' 21 In fact, the Supreme Court has
contemplated prior restraints on core First Amendment speech only in the
cases of dire threats to national security, obscenity, and incitement to acts
of violence.'22 Even under those circumstances, the proponent bears a
by demonstrating it is an
heavy burden to overcome that presumption
23
exceptional case justifying such a restraint. 1

119. See LYRISSA LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23-24 (2004) (discussing history of licensing

schemes); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 706, 722-23 (1931) (holding an injunction "abating"
a newspaper as a "public nuisance" was a prior restraint).
120. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970).

121. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976); Near, 283 U.S. at 707; N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
122. Near, 283 U.S. at 716; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 (1963).
123. See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 559; see also Bantam Books, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 446 U.S. 947 (1980) (referencing University Amusement
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However, the Supreme Court has not automatically included licensing
schemes on "non-core" speech, such as commercial speech, within its
general prohibition against prior restraints.' 24 Instead, the Court has
deemed a licensing scheme for "non-core" speech, such as obscenity, to
be an impermissible prior restraint in two instances. First, a licensing
scheme that gives unlimited discretion to the government official
determining whether to issue the license, or to permit the speech, will not
be tolerated because of the risks of censorship.' 25 Indeed, the Supreme
Court observed in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, that:
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an
ordinance which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms
which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may
be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an
unconstitutional censorship
or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of
26
those freedoms. 1
Second, a licensing system that fails to incorporate stringent procedural
safeguards to obviate the dangers of a censorship system is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. 127
The stringent procedural safeguards a licensing system must include to
be constitutional are defined in Freedman v. State of Maryland. The
licensing scheme must have 1) strict time limits leading to speedy
administrative decision and minimizing any prior restraint-type effects, 2)
burden of proof rules favoring speech, and 3) a procedure that will "assure
a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an
interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license."' 28 Under this test,
"[w]here the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license,
the risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled

Co., Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (C.A. Tex. 1978)).
124. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557,564
n.6, 571 n.13 (1980) (noting, in dicta, that a licensing scheme for commercial speech might be
constitutionally permissible).
125. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988).
126. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
127. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 670 (1976); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 552-53 (1975); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181
(1968); Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (striking down a motion picture
censorship system because it failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against
unlimited suppression of constitutionally protected speech).
128. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
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discretion. A scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the
creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible
decisionmaker
12 9

speech.

E. Attorney Advertising and the FirstAmendment in Florida
Because "a state may ban false, deceptive, or misleading commercial
speech without infringing on First Amendment rights[,]" FloridaBar v.
Gold,3' the Florida Bar has skirted the First Amendment by labelling some
categories of attorney advertising as "misleading" because they contain
information not verifiable as true or false.' 3 ' The Florida Supreme Court
has been receptive to the Bar's increasingly aggressive regulation of
attorney advertising. For example, in FloridaBar v. Pape, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the discipline of two attorneys who used the
image of a pit bull and the number 1-800-PIT-BULL in two television
advertisements. 3 2 The Pape court found the ads were "inherently
deceptive" in violation of the rules because "there is no way to measure
whether the attorneys in fact conduct themselves like pit bulls so as to
ascertain whether this logo and phone number convey accurate
information.', 33 The Pape court held that the ads fell outside of First
Amendment protection because "[1]awyer advertising enjoys First
Amendment protection only to the extent that it provides accurate factual
information that can be objectively verified.' 34 The Pape court
emphasized that:
[P]ermitting this type of advertisement would make a mockery of
our dedication to promoting public trust and confidence in our
system ofjustice. Prohibiting advertisements such as the one in this
case is one step we can take to maintain the dignity of lawyers, as
well as the integrity of, and public confidence in, the legal system
.... For the good of the legal profession and the justice system, and

129. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,227 (1990), overruledin part by Littleton v. Z.J.
Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004) on grounds Freedman'srequirement for a final decision did
not require courts to expedite review in cases involving adult businesses.
130. Fla. Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. 2006).
131. See Fla. Bar v. Lange, 711 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1998) (holding attorney ad stating
"When the Best is Simply Essential" was misleading and violated the rule against self-laudatory
statements as well as the rule prohibiting descriptions of the quality of a lawyer's services).
132. Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 2005).
133. Id.at244.
134. Id. at 247.
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consistent with our Rules of Professional Conduct, this type of nonfactual advertising cannot be permitted.'35
The Papecourt gave no support for the assertion that the advertisement
at issue would undermine public confidence in the legal system, and this
assertion seems dubious in light of an ABA study indicating that
regulation of attorney advertising "is not likely to have an impact on the
public's perception of the legal profession."' 3 6 Moreover, the Pape
decision relies on attorney dignity as a basis for regulation of attorney
advertising in contravention of U.S. Supreme Court case law summarized
above.
Despite its regulatory success in Pape,there is strong reason to believe
that the Florida Bar's strict restrictions on attorney advertising would not
pass constitutional muster in federal court. In Mason v. FloridaBar, the
Bar disciplined an attorney for violating its rule against characterizing or
describing the quality of legal services when he placed a yellow page ad
stating that he was "AV Rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell
National Law Directory."' 37 Although the Bar contended the statement was
inherently misleading, the Eleventh Circuit held that the speech was
squarely within the confines of the First Amendment and applied the
CentralHudson test. 3 8 After agreeing the Bar had a substantial interest in
both ensuring attorney advertisements are not misleading and ensuring the
public has access to relevant information, the court determined the Bar had
failed the second prong of the CentralHudson test. "A state cannot satisfy
its burden to demonstrate the harms it recites are real and that its
restrictions will alleviate the identified harm by rote invocation of the
words 'potentially misleading."" 39
Although the Bar did not seek to ban the ad, but instead to impose a
disclaimer upon it, the Eleventh Circuit ruled "[e]ven partial restrictions
on commercial speech must be supported by a showing of some
identifiable harm[,]" and the Bar had failed to satisfy its burden "of
producing concrete evidence that Mason's use of the words AV Rated, the
135. Id.at 246-47 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
136. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ADVER., THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING ON THE IMAGE OF

LAWYERS 30 (1995); see also Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional
Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1012 (2003) (demonstrating that existing studies "do not offer
much support for the idea that trust in the legal profession (generically defined) has a significant
impact on trust in the justice system.").
137. Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 954 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
138. Id.at 955.
139. Id.at 956 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994)).
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Highest Rating, threatened to mislead the public."14 As a result, the court
found Florida's rule impermissibly curtailed non-misleading commercial
speech. Despite the Florida Bar's success in Pape,its contention that much
of attorney advertising is inherently misleading, especially advertising that
appears on television, radio, or the Internet, is on shaky constitutional
ground, as the following discussion will demonstrate.
II. DISCUSSION

A. Florida'sNew andProposedRestrictionson Attorney Advertising
Violate the FirstAmendment
The U.S. Supreme Court has been expanding the reach of the First
Amendment's protections in the area of commercial speech.
The arc of the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions in
recent years has been unmistakable: in case after case the Court has
enforced the First Amendment protections set forth in Central
Hudson with increasing rigor, expanding protection for commercial
speech, and expressing ever-heightening skepticism and impatience
for governmental restrictions on advertising grounded in
protectionism and paternalism.141

140. Id. at 958.
141. Rodney A. Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity of the Profession,59 ARK. L.
REV. 437, 452 (2006) (emphasis added). Smolla cited the following cases:
Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,371 (2002) (striking down
restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising)); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525,554-55 (2001) (striking down some and sustaining some restrictions on
tobacco advertising); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999) (striking down casino gambling advertising limitations);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497, 503 (1996).
Id. n.50. Additionally, Smolla cited the 44 Liquornartcase in which the Court struck down liquor
advertisement restrictions, noting:
[A] State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful,
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to
suppress it .... [B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech...
usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond
"irrationally" to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be especially
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Yet, the Florida Bar has been moving in the other direction, tightening its
control over attorney advertising. Moreover, the Bar attempts to bypass the
First Amendment by banning some categories of attorney advertising
under the auspices it is misleading even where the statements are true or
where they are not factual in nature. Additionally, the Bar has tightly
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.
Id. (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497, 503) (citation omitted). Finally, Smolla cited the
following cases:
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (striking down beer
advertising regulations); lbanez v. [Fla.] Dep't of Bus. & Prof 1 Regulation, 512
U.S. 136, 148-49 (1994) (striking down restrictions on accountancy advertising);
Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (striking down commercial speech
limitations on accountants); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410,430-31 (1993) (striking down restrictions on newsracks for commercial
flyers and publications); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of
Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (declaring a regulation banning lawyer
advertisement of certification by the National Board of Trial Advocacy to be
misleadingly unconstitutional); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,
470-71 (1988) (holding a regulation banning solicitation for legal business mailed
on a personalized or targeted basis to prevent potential clients from feeling undue
duress to hire the attorney as unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 655-56 (1985) (striking
down some and upholding some restrictions on lawyer advertising); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983) (concluding that a statute
banning unsolicited mailings advertising contraceptives to aid parental authority
over teaching their children about birth control was unconstitutional); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191,206-07 (1982) (holding that regulations limiting the precise names
of practice areas lawyers can use in ads and identifying the jurisdictions the lawyer
is licensed in were misleadingly unconstitutional); Central Hudson [Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.], 447 U.S. [557], 571-72 [(1980)] (striking
down restrictions on advertising statements by public utilities); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (striking down restrictions on solicitation of legal business
on behalf of the ACLU); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)[]
(declaring a regulation banning lawyer advertisement of prices for routine legal
services to be misleadingly unconstitutional); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1977) (declaring a regulation banning
placement of for sale signs in the front lawns of houses in order to prevent the
town from losing its integrated racial status to be unconstitutional); [Va.] State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. [Va.] Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-73
(1976) (striking down restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (striking down restrictions on abortion
advertising).
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restricted attorneys' efforts at marketing on television, radio, and the
Internet. As a result, several sections of the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct regulating advertising are likely unconstitutional. These rules
include those banning truthful speech and nonmisleading appeals to the
emotions, the mandatory prior approval scheme for television and radio
ads, as well as the proposed rule regulating Internet communications.
B. The Licensing Scheme for TV andRadio Ads is an Unconstitutional
PriorRestraintLacking Requisite ProceduralSafeguards
The Florida Bar's system for mandatory prior review of attorney
advertising on television and radio is a prior1 restraint
lacking the
42
Amendment.
First
the
satisfy
to
needed
safeguards
A prior restraint is the "least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights" and is thus presumptively unconstitutional.'43 This
presumption of unconstitutionality may be overcome only in exceptional
cases, such as dire threats to national security. 44 However, prior restraints
in the form of licensing systems are permissible in some limited contexts,
such as the regulation of adult businesses, and the Supreme Court has
stated that a licensing system for commercial speech might not violate the
First Amendment, because commercial speech is less susceptible to being
"'chill[ed]' than other types of speech. 145 However, even in the case of
commercial speech, a licensing system is unconstitutional if it gives
unbridled discretion to the government officials administering it, or if it
fails to provide procedural safeguards to obviate the dangers of
government censorship."
Florida's new rule regarding television and radio advertising is clearly
a prior restraint in the form of a licensing system, and it lacks the
procedural safeguards necessary to pass constitutional muster. To risk
stating the obvious, the rules impose a prior restraint because they require
142. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed regulations of attorney advertisements on
television or radio. On two occasions, the Court refused to decide the scope of permissible
advertising outside of print media. In Bates v. Arizona, the Court expressly limited its decision to
advertisements of routine legal services in print, explaining, "the special problems of advertising
on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration." Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. The
Court likewise limited its holding in Zaudererto print media. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 655-56.
143. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 733 (193 1); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
144. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
145. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6, 571 n.13, 578.
146. See N.Y. Mag., Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying "the
requirement of procedural safeguards in the context of a prior restraint" on commercial speech, and
citing similar decisions from other circuits).
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attorneys to file television and radio ads they wish to run with the Florida
Bar at least fifteen days prior to their dissemination.'47 The Bar then
examines the ads for compliance with its advertising regulations and
notifies attorneys whether they can disseminate the advertisements. 48
' This
licensing system is mandatory, as is the payment of $150 per
submission.49 If an attorney runs an ad without approval, the attorney is
subject to discipline. 15 ° Taken together, it is easy to see how this system
threatens to chill attorney advertising on television and radio, and its
structure even raises the specter that chilling, or perhaps even freezing,
such ads is its main purpose.
Indeed, the structure of this system belies the Supreme Court's
assumption in CentralHudson that commercial speech will not be chilled
by licensing because it is profit-motivated. Here, an attorney must spend
money-perhaps substantial amounts of money-to develop a radio or
television advertisement. If the ad runs afoul of the Bar's censors, the
attorney will not be able to air it; so there is every incentive to include only
the most innocuous and bland content in the ad. Yet, if the only option is
innocuous and bland advertising, the attorney may decide it is simply not
profitable to advertise on radio or television. And if the Bar's censors do
not approve the ad, the attorney's speech will certainly be chilled,
probably permanently, because airing the ad may result in discipline or
disbarment.
More alarming from a First Amendment standpoint is the fact that the
rules give the officials who administer them no clear-cut, objective criteria
for approving or disapproving an advertisement. A licensing system that
gives an administrator unlimited discretion is a patently unconstitutional
prior restraint because of the potential for official censorship of unpopular
speech."'5 The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct apparently give Bar

147. FLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(A) (2007) (emphasis added).
148. Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(E).
149. Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(l)(A), (b)(7).
150. Id. R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(E).
151. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988); see also Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which
... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees
contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or
license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those
freedoms.
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officials absolute discretion to disallow an attorney's advertisement for
lack of compliance with the rules, even if compliance is judged by the
standard articulated in Rule 4-7.5(b)(1)(A), prohibiting advertising that is
"deceptive, misleading, manipulative, or that is likely to confuse the
viewer."
It is not even clear whether information that would be permissible in
print advertisements would survive the Bar's official gauntlet. To cite
recent evidence of the breadth of discretion the decision-maker is given in
Florida, compare three recent cases. In one, the Board of Governors
reversed a decision by the Bar staff and Standing Committee on
Advertising to disallow a television ad showing a mock courtroom;
however, the Board of Governors denied appeal in a case involving an ad
that used the language 'legal firepower when you need it most' and in
another case involving an image of model cars crashing into each other.'52
It is far from clear how these ads would dupe potential legal services
consumers; nor is it clear why the two denied ads were somehow more
misleading or manipulative than the permitted one. These nebulous and illdefined standards raise the specter of official censorship that the First
Amendment forbids, even in the case of commercial speech. This specter
threatens to materialize even more in a situation, such as this, where Bar
leaders have repeatedly expressed hostility to attorney advertising and
where the Bar has attempted to aggressively regulate potentially
misleading information based on concerns for the dignity of the
profession.
Even ifFlorida's licensing scheme included less arbitrary standards for
restraining radio and television advertising, it still lacks the procedural
safeguards that the First Amendment demands. The Florida Bar's
censorship scheme does not meet Freedman's requirements. 3 First, it
lacks strict time limits. How long must the time limit be? Freedman v.
State ofMarylandisinstructive in this regard. Freedmaninvolved a statute
making it unlawful to exhibit a motion picture without a license. Although
preclearance of motion pictures is constitutionally permissible, any
restraint must be for "the shortest fixed period compatible with sound
judicial resolution."' 54 Under Freedman,challenges to a movie censorship

Id.at 151.
152. Bar Says Lawyers in Different Areas May Share800 Numbers, FLA. BARNEWS, Jan. 15,

2007, at 2 [hereinafter Bar Says].
153. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
154. Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
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decision must be heard within one day, and a decision must be rendered
within two more days.' 55
In comparison, the Florida Bar's fifteen-day time frame for initial
review of radio and television ads seems much too long to suppress
constitutionally protected speech, at least when weighed against any
potential harm. Second, there is no indication that the government bears
the burden of proof to justify suppression of the attorney's speech. In fact,
while an attorney may request an advisory opinion prior to the television
or radio ad's dissemination, the opinion is not binding on the bar and the
attorney can still be disciplined for running the ad.'56 Finally, the process
for review of the denial of the attorney's right to air an advertisement does
not appear to assure a prompt final judicial decision. If Bar staff or the
Bar's Standing Committee on Advertising determines that an
advertisement fails to comply with the rules, the attorney wishing to
advertise may appeal to a seven-member subcommittee of the Board of
Governors, known as the Board Review Committee.' 57 The Board Review
Committee will review the decision at the next regularly scheduled
meeting of the Board of Governors, or, in some instances, the following
meeting. The Board Review Committee then reports its decision to the
Board of Governors to approve, deny, or modify, and it then becomes a
final board opinion. 15 Although this process gives an attorney several
chances to get a second opinion on the permissibility of his advertisement,
it does not appear to meet the strict procedural requirements of Freedman.
As a result, Florida's licensing scheme for attorney ads on radio and
television is unconstitutional and should be repealed or struck down.

155. Id. In Freedman,the Supreme Court indicated that its decision in Kingsley v. Brown, 354
U.S. 436 (1957), provided guidance as to permissible procedures. Id. at 60. Kingsley upheld aNew
York injunctive procedure designed to prevent the sale of obscene books. Id. The Court approved
the New York procedure because it "postpone[d] any restraint against sale until a judicial
determination of obscenity following notice and an adversary hearing." Id. New York "provide[d]
for a hearing one day after joinder of issue" and required the judge to "hand down his decision
within two days after termination of the hearing." Id. (referencing Kingsley, 354 U.S. at 439).
156. FLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7(a)(1)(B) (2007).
157. See Advertising Rules, Fla. Bar Procedures for Issuing Advisory Opinions Relating to
Lawyer Advertising or Solicitation, §§ 3-6 [hereinafter Advertising Rules], available at
http://www.floridabar.org.
158. See generally Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, Review of Lawyer Advertisements and
Solicitations, Ch. 15, availableathttp://www.floridabar.org; see Advertising Rules, supranote 157,
§ 1 (providing "Staff opinions, standing committee on advertising opinions, and opinions of the
board of governors are advisory only and shall not be the basis for action by grievance committees,
referees, or the board of governors except upon application of the respondent in disciplinary
proceedings.").
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C. Florida'sContent-BasedRestrictions on TV and Radio Advertising
Cannot Survive Intermediate Scrutiny
Even if Florida's licensing scheme could surmount these obstacles, the
specific content restrictions it imposes are unconstitutional under the
intermediate scrutiny test of CentralHudson.
1. Television and Radio Ads are Not Inherently Misleading
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that Florida has not, and
doubtless cannot, establish that all radio and television advertising by
Florida attorneys is inherently misleading so as to be outside the scope of
First Amendment scrutiny. 5 9 The comments to Florida's new rules appear
to make such an argument by asserting that radio and television
advertisements create "incorrect public perceptions.., about the manner
in which our legal system works."' 60 Moreover, the comments attempt to
justify regulations by reference to unique features of radio and television
ads, including "the numbers of viewers reached.., and the inability of the
bar to patrol the airwaves.'' l1 l It is certainly not self-evident that the nature
of the broadcast (or cable or satellite) medium makes information
presented there inherently more misleading than advertising in print. Nor
does the First Amendment allow more rigorous regulation of television
and radio advertising simply because it has a broader reach or is a more
effective means of communication than print.
2. The Content Restrictions are More Extensive than Necessary
Because television and radio ads are not inherently misleading, Florida
must show that a substantial state interest supports the specific content
prohibitions it has chosen to impose, and that these prohibitions are not
more extensive than necessary to achieve that purpose. Although
protecting consumers from misleading legal advertisements-unlike
protecting attorney dignity-is a substantial state interest, Florida's
content prohibitions are tangential at best and inimical at worst to the goal
of assisting consumers to make informed and intelligent decisions.
Florida's Rule 4-7.5 forbids the "use of scenes creating suspense, ...
exaggerations, or situations calling for legal services, [and] scenes creating

159. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
160. FLA. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.5 cmt. (2007).

161. Id. R. 4-7.7 cmt. (2007).
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consumer problems through characterization and dialogue."' 62 It also
the public" or
forbids the use of spokespersons "recognizable 1to
63
music."'
instrumental
than
other
sounds
"background
The burden is on Florida to show that these content restrictions address
a real harm, and that its regulatory scheme "will in fact alleviate them to
a material degree."'" Florida has not carried this burden, probably because
it is impossible to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Zauderer
that consumers are used to attention-getting devices in commercial
advertisements. 65 Florida residents are routinely exposed to television
advertising containing such devices by out-of-state attorneys and even
non-lawyers."' It thus seems implausible that the Bar's strict prohibitions
on common marketing devices bears any relation to, much less directly
advances, its goal of protecting Florida consumers of legal services;
instead, the only effect seems to be to put Florida attorneys at a
competitive disadvantage in informing clients about their services. 167 To
illustrate, the Bar recently denied approval for an ad by a Florida attorney
containing model cars crashing into each other. 68 This ad may be
memorable (or not), but it hardly seems manipulative, because Florida
residents would be unlikely to mistake it for a real case result obtained by
the advertising lawyer. The fact that Florida has chosen to target such
common advertising devices not only undercuts the argument that the rules
are narrowly drawn to protect consumers; it also leads to the conclusion
that the content prohibitions rest on constitutionally discredited
justifications for regulation: either official distaste for these advertising

162. Id. R. 4-7.5 cmt. (2007).
163. Id. R. 4-7.5(b)(1)(B)-(C).
164. Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
165. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,648-49 (1985) (permitting use
of accurate illustration of intrauterine device).
166. See, e.g., Personal Injury Advertisement, Stamatakis & Thaljl, P.L., at
www. I 800askgary.com (previously showing an ad of a group of non-lawyers who urge auto
accident victims to make use of their services using dramatizations and testimonial). The web site
is currently under construction and unavailable.
167. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is charged with protecting consumers from
deceptive advertising, has rejected the notion that the presence of attention-getting devices makes
advertising per se misleading. In a letter criticizing New York Bar rules similar to those in Florida,
the FTC asserted that the Bar should not regulate dramatizations and other "common methods that
advertising firms have used to make their messages memorable" because such devices "are unlikely
to hoodwink unsuspecting consumers, because consumers are usually familiar with them." See
Letter from the FTC's Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Consumer Protection, and Bureau of
Economics to Michael Colodner, Office of Court Administration (Sept. 14, 2006).
168. Bar Says, supranote 152.
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devices as "beneath the[] dignity" of the profession, 69 or the "paternalistic
assumption" that consumers of legal services "are no more discriminating
than the audience for children's television. 17 °
One final feature confirms that the television and radio advertising
rules are more extensive than necessary. The rules contain no exemption
for advertising about pro bono legal services by nonprofit political
organizations. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that legal solicitation by
such groups is core political speech, and regulation of it is subject to strict
scrutiny.171 Clearly, a prior restraint on core political speech, with its
attendant filing and fee requirements, is unconstitutional. 172 Just as clearly,
Florida's17content-based restrictions on such speech cannot survive strict
scrutiny.

1

3. Disclosure Requirements are Constitutionally Preferable to
Prohibiting Speech
Even if Florida justifies its content restrictions based on the dubious
argument that the regulated content is misleading because it is not factual
in nature or because it is not literally true, 174 simple disclosure
requirements could cure any potential deception. For example, a
dramatization could be accompanied by a disclaimer stating that it did not
depict an actual attorney-client interaction. As the Supreme Court stated
in In re R.MJ.,' 7 5 the states may not "place an absolute prohibition on
certain types of potentially misleading information... if the information

169. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 648.
170. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990);
Cf Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to accept polling data regarding
public opinion of lawyers as evidence of real harm).
171. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978).
172. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("Pentagon Papers" case)
(striking down prior restraint on political speech even in the face of an alleged threat to national
security).
173. See Primus,436 U.S. at 439 (striking down ban on solicitation by ACLU).
174. Florida appears to have taken the position that it can regulate any speech that is not
demonstrably truthful, but this is a reversal of the constitutional equation. The First Amendment
permits Florida to regulate speech that is false and misleading; this does not mean that speech that
is not demonstrably truthful, perhaps because it is satirical or is a dramatization of a truthful event,
is inherently misleading. See N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Formal Op. 661 (1994) (rejecting the
argument that dramatizations are inherently misleading); Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d
228, 234 (Conn. 1984) (holding that a TV ad depicting a humorous dramatization was informative
rather than misleading).
175. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive."' 7 6 Incidentally, this
preference for disclosure suggests the absurdity of a denial of approval to
an ad showing crashing model cars; it seems ludicrous to suggest that this
ad should be accompanied by a disclaimer that "it does not depict a real
case," because consumers would be well aware of that fact and could not
possibly be misled even without the disclaimer.
D. The FloridaBar's ProposedRule RegulatingInternet
Communications Violates the FirstAmendment
Currently, Florida's Rules of Professional Conduct regulating
computer-accessed communications treat attorney homepages and web
sites as information provided upon request of a potential client. 7 7 This
approach removes them from the purview of the general advertising rule,
Rule 4-7.2, although they are subject to a few special disclosure
requirements not applicable to other information provided upon request.
It is not clear that any untoward consequences have resulted from this
approach, and indeed an Advertising Task Force appointed by the Bar
recommended that attorney web sites continue to be governed by this
approach. 7 ' The Bar rejected this recommendation, and several Florida
Supreme Court justices have asked for strong regulation of Internet
advertising. 79 After four years of debate, the Bar adopted changes to its
existing rules on computer-accessed communications at its meeting on
March 30, 2007.
Proposed Rule 4-7.6 will no longer treat home pages as information
provided upon request, but will instead subject them, along with other
attorney web sites, to most of the rules regulating attorney advertising in
print media. 80 The proposed rule, however, does give more leeway to
attorneys advertising on the Internet than in other media. It would permit
factually verifiable statements concerning past results, testimonials, and
factually verifiable statements describing or characterizing the quality of
the lawyer's services as long as these communications are not misleading

176. Id.; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (stating "the preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less."); Thompson v. W. State Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373
(2002) (noting, in a commercial speech case, that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it
means that regulating speech must be a last-not first-resort.").
177. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.6 (2002) (amend. proposed Aug. 1, 2005).
178. See supra note 63.
179. See supra note 63.
180. FLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4-7.6(b)(1) (2002) (amend. proposed Aug. 1,2005);
see supra note 63.
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and contain specified disclaimers.' 8' Significantly, it appears that most
Internet ads will not be subject to the filing requirements or fees applicable
to print ads. Even with these exceptions for Internet advertising, the
proposed rule violates the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has given noncommercial Internet speech full First
Amendment protection.8 2 Thus, commercial speech on the Internet ought
to receive just as much First Amendment protection as commercial speech
in any other medium. Any regulation of Internet commercial speech,
including attorney advertising, must satisfy the intermediate scrutiny test
of CentralHudson.
Under this test, Florida's proposed rule governing computer-accessed
communications fails constitutional muster. Whether or not the Florida
Bar has a substantial interest in imposing more stringent regulations on
Internet advertising than it has heretofore done, Florida has provided no
evidence that the more stringent proposed regulations respond to any
actual threat to Florida consumers of legal services. Florida bears the
183
burden of showing that its regulation "directly advances" its interests.
To do so, it must show that "the harms it recites are real" and that its
regulations will "alleviate them to a material degree."'8 4 As of this point,
its regulation appears to be based on "mere speculation" that its current
regulations are insufficiently stringent to protect Florida consumers. 85 In
this regard, the advertising that the regulations leave unchanged casts
grave doubts on the efficacy of the regulations in protecting Florida
consumers of legal services.
The proposed rule regulates advertising by Florida attorneys. Yet, the
Internet is a medium that crosses state, national, and international
boundaries. Even if the proposed rule is effective in ridding the Internet of
advertising by Florida attorneys deemed to be misleading, Florida
consumers can still access speech by out-of-state attorneys not subject to
the constraints of the proposed rule. Every state has its own bar, and unlike
Florida, the vast majority of them do not consider marketing devices such
as dramatizations to be misleading.
Thus, the proposed rule does not really prevent Florida consumers from
being "misled" by dramatizations or other creative marketing devices; it

181.

1,2005).
182.
183.
(1980).
184.
185.

FLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.6(b)(2)(A)-(C) (2002) (amend. proposed Aug.

See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 884 (1997).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
See id.
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merely deprives Florida attorneys of potentially effective marketing
devices used by their out-of-state competitors. 8 6 Moreover, the proposed
rule cannot prevent non-lawyers in Florida from using creative advertising
devices to lure potential consumers of legal services away from Florida
lawyers. For example, the television ad for 1-800-Ask-Gary targets victims
of auto accidents in Florida using a testimonial and a dramatization.87
Potential consumers of legal services in Florida are constantly exposed to
marketing devices forbidden to Florida lawyers, making it difficult for the
Florida Bar to establish that its new restrictions are necessary to
accomplish a substantial state interest. The very ineffectiveness of these
regulations in protecting Florida consumers makes it more likely that they
were passed to serve an interest other than consumer protection.
Regardless of whether Florida can establish that its new restrictions on
Internet advertising directly advance its interest in protecting consumers,
the breadth of the new regulation trespasses much too far into the realm of
constitutionally protected speech. To satisfy the First Amendment,
Florida's proposed rule must be "'no more extensive than reasonably
necessary ' "1 88 to accomplish the goal of protecting Florida consumers;
Florida need not choose the least restrictive means of regulating speech,89
but it must demonstrate a "reasonable fit" between its ends and means.1
This Florida cannot do.
Florida's proposed rule cut through a vast swath of attorney speech,
both commercial and non-commercial, under its definition of computeraccessed communications. The proposed rule restricts all "information
regarding a lawyer's or law firm's services that is read, viewed, or heard
directly through the use of a computer."190 Intentionally or not, the rule
thereby sweeps into its orbits many types of non-commercial speech. For
example, the proposed rule appears to govern the blogs of Florida

186. Depending on the circumstances, these out-of-state competitors might be subject to
punishment for unauthorized practice of law if they establish an attomey-client relationship with
a Florida resident, but there are many instances in which they could lawfully provide legal services
to a Florida resident.
187. Until recently, a companion 1-800-Ask-Gary web site used similar devices. The Ask Gary
ads are exempt from Bar Rules because they are sponsored by a "chain of accident clinics"
controlled by a chiropractor. However, the ads did in fact trigger a Bar investigation of lawyers who
may have received referrals from the 1-800-Ask-Gary ads. Michael Sasso, 1-800-Ask-Gary Get
Lawyers in Trouble, TAMPA TRIB., June 23, 2007, available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/
article/20070623/NEWS/706230536/- 1/.
188. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 207
(1982)).
189. Id. at 480.
190. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.6(a) (2002) (amend. proposed Aug. 1, 2005).
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attorneys that contain general discussion of Florida law, such as Matt
Conigliaro's blog (www.abstractappeal.com) or Janet Langjahr's blog
(www.fladivorcelawblog.com). These blogs can be "read... through the
use of a computer," and they include "information regarding [the] lawyer's
...
services."'' Although such blogs may indirectly garner clients for their
authors, they are comprised predominantly of expression that lies at the
core of the First Amendment. Even a law review or bar journal article
written by a licensed Florida attorney, which is accessible online, may be
covered by the proposed rule and regulated as advertising. After all, even
a law review article includes information regarding a lawyer's services, if
only in its initial footnote noting the author's institutional affiliation and
(perhaps) area of practice. The Florida Bar and the Florida Supreme Court
have absolutely no legitimate interest in regulating this type of attorney
speech.
E. The FloridaBar's Prohibitionson Truthful and Non-Misleading
Speech Violate the FirstAmendment
The Florida Bar appears to have misapprehended the scope of its power
to regulate attorney advertising. The First Amendment protects truthful,
non-misleading commercial speech. 92 To the extent that Florida wishes to
regulate truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, it must establish that
its regulation directly advances a substantial state interest and is no more
extensive than necessary to accomplish that interest. Speech may not be
regulated merely because it has the potential to mislead. Nor may it be
regulated because some might find it tasteless or offensive. Nor may
speech be labeled misleading base purely on paternalistic assumptions
about its audience.
Yet the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney
advertising assume that an attorney advertisement may be banned, unless
an attorney can verify to the Bar's satisfaction that the advertisement is
truthful and non-misleading. Indeed, some of the rules go further and ban
completely truthful speech that seems unlikely to mislead any but the most
sheltered and credulous of Florida residents. The Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct completely ban (in some media) references to past
results, testimonials, comparisons with other lawyers' services, statements
that characterize the quality of an attorney's services, and completely ban
(in all media) depictions that create suspense or appeals to the emotions

191. Id.
192. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372-74 (1977).
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under the theory these statements are "misleading.' 9 3 Thus, statements in
print or on television or radio that an attorney received a million-dollar
damage award, that an attorney prevailed in ninety percent of cases that
went to trial, or that an attorney is experienced in tax law are all
considered misleading by the Florida Bar, whether they are verifiably true
or not. The Florida Bar justifies its ban by asserting these prohibited
statements "are inherently misleading to a person untrained in the law."19' 4
However, labeling truthful speech as misleading does not make it so,
especially when Florida residents are bombarded daily with similar
advertising by out-of-state attorneys and non-lawyers. As the esteemed
First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla has noted,
To grant bar regulators carte blanche to label advertising
"inherently misleading," releasing them of the burdens of
supporting evidence or the consideration of regulatory alternatives,
is to put the fox in guard of the coop. These are the exercises that
give the Central Hudson test its bite, and if they may be
pretermitted by the recitation of the phrase "inherently misleading,"
the First Amendment safeguards embedded in the CentralHudson
test are entirely bypassed.'95
Truthful speech may not be regulated based on the unsupported argument
that it might mislead someone somewhere. Thus, Florida's attempt to
prohibit truthful speech by labeling it misleading based on no evidence
whatsoever bypasses the dictates of the First Amendment.
The rules also exceed the scope of permissible regulation by attempting
to restrict advertising merely because it appeals to the emotions of its
audience. The rules appear to rely on a false corollary: Just because false
and misleading advertising maybe regulated does not mean that all speech
that is not demonstrably true may be regulated. The U.S. Supreme Court
has expressly rejected the idea that speech which does no more than gain
attention is inherently misleading. 96
' The Court recognizes that non-factual
elements of advertising have First Amendment value: "The use of
illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important communicative
functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's

193. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2 (2007); id.R. 4-7.6 (2002) (amend. proposed
Aug. 1,2005) (exempting web sites from provisions banning references to past results, testimonials,
and verifiable characterizations of quality).
194. Id.R. 4-7.2 cmt. (2007).
195. Smolla, supra note 141, at 466 (emphasis added).
196. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
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' Thus,
messages, and it may also serve to impart information directly."197
the Florida Bar's total ban on depictions that create suspense or appeals to
the emotions is actually an attempt to ban speech protected by the First
Amendment.
In conclusion, the Florida Bar's total prohibition on references to past
results, testimonials, comparisons with other lawyers' services, statements
that characterize the quality of a lawyer's services, and depictions that
create suspense or appeals to the emotions is unconstitutional and should
be repealed.

F. The FloridaBar's Strict Policing ofAttorney Advertising is Bad
Public Policy and Should Be Repealed
Even if Florida's tight restrictions on attorney advertising could satisfy
the demands of the First Amendment, the restrictions are bad public policy
and should be repealed.
First, Florida Bar's stringent rules limit access of the poor to the legal
system. Tight advertising rules "foster economic interests at the expense
1198 "For those in lower income and
of broader access to legal services ....
less well connected classes, however, advertising is fresh information
about serious legal needs that people may have right now. Stifling lawyer
advertising is class legislation in the name of professional dignity. ' 9 In
fact, a 1993 study found that one-fifth of low income people found counsel
based on television ads, a number that is almost certainly higher today.2" 0
Second, restrictions on attorney advertising limit the ability of the
market to effectively operate. Advertising by attorneys allows consumers
to find affordable legal services and makes consumers aware of the option
of legal services. The Federal Trade Commission has concluded "the two
principal reasons why consumers do not consult lawyers are the result of
inadequate information: consumers believe they will be unable to afford
legal counsel; and consumers do not know how to find a lawyer ... 20
Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission found prices for legal services
were highest in jurisdictions with the most stringent advertising rules and
lowest in jurisdictions where regulation on attorney advertising was
197. Id.(emphasis added).
198. Hornsby, supra note 10, at 256.
199. Van O'Steen, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The PersonalAccount of a Partyand the
Consumer Benefits ofLawyer Advertising, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245,253 (2005) (quoting Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Comment on Proposed Arizona Advertising Rule (July 2, 1991) (on file with author)).
200. See Mark Ballard, Coming to Terms with the $20,000 Ad, NAT'LL.J., Oct. 7,2002, at Al.
201. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO
LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS OF TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 1 (1984).
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small.2 °2 Thus, "[c]ompetition among lawyers, in the form of commercial
advertising, has resulted in lower prices to consumers. 2 3
Third, the Rules are unduly paternalistic. Empirical evidence shows an
increase in "consumers' confidence in lawyers" with increased attorney
advertising.2° Moreover, "[t]he advertisements inform the listener of the
value of professional legal assistance .

. .

. If some members of the

audience find them distasteful, such consumers might very well react by
shunning the service offered, thereby imposing an informal sanction more
effective than any formal regulation. 2 5
Fourth, the legal environment has drastically changed from the period
when attorneys could simply rely on word-of-mouth to market their
services. In an increasingly urbanized environment with shifting patterns
of using information technology, competition is much more fierce,
requiring firms to try to find new avenues of advertising and marketing.20 6
Many attorneys are attempting to market their law practices in new,
different, and creative ways.20 7 They should not be hamstrung in their
attempts by misguided regulators operating on unfounded assumptions
about attorney advertising.
IV. CONCLUSION

The new Florida Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney
advertising on radio and television, and the proposed rule governing
Internet advertising, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and should be repealed and rejected, respectively.

202. Id.
203. O'Steen, supranote 199, at 251.
204. Terrence C. Mead, Writing the Law on Lawyer Advertising, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 191, 197
(1991).
205. Grievance Comm. for the Hartford-New Britain Judicial Dist. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 228,
234 (Conn. 1984).
206. Milton C. Regan, Law FirmsCompetitionPenalties,and the Values ofProfessionalism,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHMCS 1, 9, 11 (1999).
207. Jill Schachner Chanen, Watch What You Say, 91 A.B.A. J. 58, 59 (2005).
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